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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In attempting to understand how people make judgments
about the strength of relation between variables, few
researchers have distinguished between events which are
causally related and those which are noncausally related.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) emphasize the theoretical
distinction between judgments of covariation and judgments of
causality. They consider covariation as just one of many
"cues to causality," along with such things as temporal order
and contiguity. Hilton (1988) also discusses the limitations
of a covariational definition of causality. He notes that
often there are conditions which covary with an effect, but
are not considered causes of that effect. For example, there
may be a high correlation between hair color and eye color,
yet one would not claim that this relation is causal. A
covariational definition of causality is particularly
incomplete in situations in which there is interdependence
among causes. In such cases, there may be a chain of causal
events leading up to an outcome, and intuition will easily
point to one of the events as the cause of the outcome. These
judgments are dependent on more than the size of the
correlation, or the degree of covariation, between the event
and the outcome. According to Hilton, certain types of causal
connections, such as abnormal conditions and goal states, are
2most likely to be selected from the causal chain as the cause
of the outcome.
There is empirical support from a number of domains that
suggests that people are sensitive to causal relationships,
and that causal information is processed differently than
noncausal information. In a study of the perseverance of
people's social theories, Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980)
found that subjects were more likely to hold on to their
beliefs after being presented with discrediting information
if they had first generated causal elaborations for their
beliefs. In studies of text comprehension and memory, there
is a great deal of empirical evidence which points to the
importance of the causal structure of text on readers'
understanding and memory of the text. For example, Myers,
Shinjo, and Duffy (1987) found that subjects had better recall
for sentence pairs if they formed causal elaborations to
integrate the two sentences while they were reading.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) argue that people are likely
to use information from all four cells of a traditional
2X2 table (See Table 1) when they make a judgment of
covariation. On the other hand, they suggest that people may
ignore information from some of the cells when making a
judgment of causality. Einhorn and Hogarth also distinguish
between two types of causal judgments. People may interpret
the task of assessing causality as requiring a judgment about
the sufficiency or the necessity of the cause. If suspected
3cause X is sufficient to cause effect Y, then cell B should
be empty, or in the least be considerably smaller than cell
A. If, on the other hand, subjects are thinking about
causality in terms of necessity, they are more likely to
contrast cell A with cell C. if suspected cause X is
necessary for effect Y to occur, then cell c should be empty,
or at least be smaller than cell A.
Despite the variety of evidence which suggests that
causality is a psychologically real and important construct,
it is not clear how strategies for making judgments of
strength of relation are affected by whether or not the
relation is causal. Most of the covariation research has
concentrated on the general question of competence for making
a judgment of strength of relation. For example, Nisbett and
Ross (1980) made the strong claim that people do not have an
understanding of the concept of correlation, while Crocker
(1981) argued that Nisbett and Ross were overly pessimistic,
and that people are often able to use covariation information
appropriately in order to make reasonable judgments of
strength of relation.
In order to reach any consensus about people's ability
to make judgments of relation, there must be an understanding
of the processes that are involved. The development of a
process model is complicated by the possibility that there may
be many ways of making such judgments. Not only may there be
significant individual differences, but people may be flexible
4enough to tailor their strategies to deal with the particular
characteristics of the judgment task. Empirically, subjects
have been shown to be sensitive to a variety of task
characteristics, demonstrating different strategies and levels
of competence as these task characteristics change.
Therefore, as Einhorn and Hogarth have stated, "..the question
is not whether people sometimes ignore relevant information
but rather, under what conditions is particular information
ignored" (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986, p. 8).
Crocker (1981) has begun to examine the process more
systematically by dividing the task into six subtasks
including: (1) deciding what data are relevant, (2) sampling
cases, (3) classifying instances, (4) recalling the evidence
and estimating the frequencies of confirming and disconf irming
cases, (5) integrating the evidence, and (6) using the
covariation estimate. Although these may all be involved in
real-world judgments, laboratory studies vary greatly as to
which of these tasks subjects are actually asked to perform.
For example, in some studies, subjects are presented with
frequency information in summary form (e.g. Shaklee & Mims,
1982 ; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). In these studies, the task is
simplified because the first four steps have already been
completed. On the other hand, there is serious question as
to subjects' ability to understand the 2X2 table in which
the summary information is presented, (e.g. Peterson & Beach,
1967). In other studies (e.g. Shaklee & Hall, 1983), data are
presented case by case so that subjects are responsible for
steps three and four as well, and an additional source of
potential errors is introduced.
When task demands are made more complex and the
information processing demands increased, subjects often
respond by ignoring much of the relevant data and basing their
judgments on a degraded set of stimuli (Crocker, 1983).
Shaklee and Mims (1982) found that subjects who had to
remember frequency information were less accurate in their
judgments than subjects who were presented with frequency
information in already tabulated form. Jenkins and Ward
(1965) also found that subjects were more likely to base their
judgments on all the available information when they were
given data in summary form than when the information was
presented serially.
Altering the wording of the question that subjects are
asked has also been shown to bias the interpretation of the
task (Crocker, 1982; Seggie, 1987). Crocker compared three
different questions, two of which clearly emphasized a certain
type of information: (1) "You want to find out if there is
a relationship or connection between working out the day
before a (tennis) match and winning that match." (2) "You
want to find out if there is a relationship or connection
between working out the day before a match and losing that
match." In the third condition, the question was unbiased and
did not emphasize any one type of instance: "You want to find
6
out if there is a relationship or connection between whether
or not you work out the day before a match and whether you win
or lose the match." Subjects were asked to indicate what
information they thought they needed in order to make a
judgment of the relation or connection between the two
variables. Subjects in the unbiased condition requested more
information than subjects in either of the biasing conditions.
Also, as was expected, subjects in the two biasing conditions
most often requested information of the type mentioned in
their questions: Subjects in the first condition were more
likely to ask how often the match was won after working out
the day before the match, while subjects in the second
condition more frequently asked how often people lost their
match after working out the day before the match. Thus
Crocker concluded that the wording of the question can
significantly influence subjects' understanding of the task
and their strategy for making that judgment.
Other task demands which have been shown to influence
subjects' strategies are characteristics of the stimuli
themselves. Jennings et al. (1982) compared subjects'
judgments of covariation in a data-based condition and a
theory-based condition. In the data-based condition subjects
were required to make judgments about stimuli for which they
had no real-world theories. For example, they examined
drawings of men of varying heights carrying walking sticks of
varying heights, and were asked about the relation between the
7two. In the theory-based condition subjects' judgments were
based only on their prior expectations or theories and no data
were provided. For example, they were asked to judge the
strength of relation between such variables as "students'
self-ratings of ambitiousness" and "students' heights," or
"students' ratings of Congress's performance in the past
decade" and "students' ratings of labor leaders' performance
in the past decade."
Jennings et al. found that subjects were much more
conservative when their judgments were based only on the data.
They were unlikely to venture into the upper half of the 100
point scale even when the objective correlations were as high
as .85. They concluded that unless our prior theories lead
us to predict strong relations, we are unlikely to detect them
even when they occur. Wright and Murphy (1984) also found
that it was beneficial for subjects to have a theory about the
data, even if their theory was eventually discontinued by the
data. Subjects with prior theories were less sensitive to
outlying values and made judgments which were more congruent
with normative measures.
Given that subjects have been shown to be sensitive to
some characteristics of the stimuli, it is reasonable to ask
how the causal nature of the relation between the variables
affects subjects' performance. Most of the empirical and
theoretical work in the covariation literature has tended to
gloss over the distinction between causal and noncausal
8relations even though questions relating to causality have
long had a place of importance in the field of psychology, as
well as in fields as diverse as philosophy, statistics,
psychology, law, and economics (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). in
fact, the philosopher Hume (1739/1960) believed that our
understanding of causation was the "cement of the universe"
(White, 1988).
Some theories suggest that our ability to detect causal
relations is a very basic, and possibly even innate ability.
According to Michotte, an ability to detect cause and effect
is necessary in order to function successfully in the world.
Michotte believed that even infants' perceptions of physical
objects include more than physical features such as color and
shape. Our initial perceptions are more abstract and include
a knowledge of an object's causal qualities.
White (1988) also suggests that the ability to detect
cause is a very basic ability which is either innate or, in
the least, present within a few months of birth. He suggests
that causal reasoning has its beginning in iconic processing.
From a very young age we are able to temporally integrate
events which are stored in a single icon, thus perceiving one
as causing the other. White, like others, suggests a set of
invariant features which define causal relations: temporal
contiguity, spatial contiguity, temporal order, and similarity
between the antecedent and the consequent. White believes
that whereas iconic processing is automatic, the infant soon
9learns to generalize these four primitives and then uses them
to evaluate more abstract causal relations.
If there are a set of primitives which are unique to
causal reasoning, people may treat causal relations in a
qualitatively distinctive manner which differs from their
treatment of relations which are not causal. As mentioned,
Einhorn and Hogarth suggest that judgments which are strictly
judgments of covariation are more likely to involve equal
attention to all four cells of the contingency table.
Like Einhorn and Hogarth, Green et al. (1979) believe
that the attention given to the four types of instances may
depend upon the causal nature of the relations. When subjects
are asked to make a "choice," they are likely to consider a
causal, or one-way relationship, in which one event must
precede the other. When instructed to make a "judgment," they
may view the relationship as a two-way, or noncausal
relationship, in which neither event necessarily precedes the
other. For example, if instructed to "choose" which of two
medications caused patients to recover most quickly, subjects
are likely to view the medication as causing the recovery.
On the other hand, if instructed to make a "judgment" about
the relation between hair color and eye color, subjects are
not likely to perceive one variable as causing the other,
because there is no obvious way to order the two variables.
Subjects should be as likely to consider the number of
instances of blue eyes in the presence of blond hair as they
10
are to consider the number of instances of blond hair in the
presence of blue eyes.
There may be confounds in the covariation literature
due to the tendency to ignore this distinction, and to assume
the same process for judgments of causality and judgments of
covariation. For example, little attention has been paid to
the effect of the wording of the question on subjects'
understanding of the causal nature of the task, and as
Crocker's work suggests (Crocker 1982), subjects' performance
may be influenced by the specific wording of the question. In
some studies subjects are asked to judge the degree to which
an outcome is controlled or influenced by some action
performed by the subject (e.g. Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Allan
& Jenkins, 1980), while other studies ask subjects to judge
the "degree or strength of relationship." It is reasonable
to hypothesize that certain questions may lead subjects to
assume that the variables are causally related, while other
questions may leave the relations unspecified or imply that
the relations are noncausal.
Not only may some questions bias subjects to interpret
the task causally or noncausally, but as noted earlier, there
may be more than one type of causally biasing question.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) discuss the distinction between
forward and backward causal inference. A question such as "You
will be asked to judge the degree of influence that medication
has on recovery." is a forward causal inference, from event
11
to outcome. According to Einhorn and Hogarth this asks the
question "Will medication lead to recovery?"
, and suggests to
subjects that they are to look for cases in which recovery did
not occur in the presence of the medication. This focuses
attention on cell B, or on the difference between cell A and
cell B.
On the other hand, the question: "You will be asked to
judge the degree to which recovery is influenced by the
medication." requires a backward causal inference, from the
outcome to the event. This question implies the counter-
factual question, "Would recovery have occurred if the
medication was not taken?" This may encourage subjects to
consider cases in which taking the medication did not lead to
recovery, and focus attention on cell C, or on the difference
between cell A and cell C.
A second factor influencing judgment is the degree of
causality suggested by the variables. It has been hypothesized
that subjects are more likely to reason causally when
presented with variables which have a one-way relation, such
as medication and recovery, than with variables which have a
two-way relation, such as hair color and eye color. And as
Jennings et al. (1982) have shown, subjects' judgments may be
influenced by the specific characteristics of the variables.
Although there have not been any thorough and conclusive
investigations of the effects of the causal versus noncausal
distinction on subjects' strategies, several studies have
12
investigated certain aspects of the question. Both Adi et al.
(1978) and Green et al. (1979) have concluded that subjects
display a higher level of thought, in Piagetian terms, when
making judgments about noncausal, or two-way relations, than
with judgments of causal, or one-way relations.
Adi et al. compared ninth and twelfth-grade high school
students' judgments of a causal relation (pill taking and body
size of rats) with a noncausal, or "coincidental" relation
(tail color and body size of rats). Subjects were asked if
a "relation existed" between the two variables, and were
subsequently interviewed as to how they had arrived at their
conclusions. Subjects' judgment rules were divided into nine
categories, which corresponded to four Piagetian stages of
development
.
A significant difference in response type was found as
a function of type of relation, causal or coincidental. In
the coincidental task, 34 of 40 subjects were classified in
the top two of the four Piagetian stages, while only 17 of
the 40 subjects in the causal condition were classified at
these levels.
Unfortunately, this study contained several serious
methodological flaws. Distinctions between the nine
categories were somewhat unclear. Furthermore,
classifications were based entirely on subjects' self-reports
rather than on their actual judgments. There is good reason
to question subjects' ability to analyze and communicate their
13
own reasoning, especially for a task as complex as a judgment
of covariation. Shaklee and Hall (1983) found limited
congruence between subjects' self-reports of their covariation
judgment rules and their actual judgments.
Green et al. (1979) also compared causal, or one-way,
and noncausal, or two-way, relationships. They found
significant differences between the two conditions, although
again, the methodology was questionable. Like the Adi et al.
study, responses were classified into Piagetian levels of
thought. The classifications were inconsistent. For example,
the comparison of the two row conditional probabilities,
(A/(A+B) - C/(C+D)), is included in both level 3 and level 4.
In addition, a comparison of conditional probabilities is
rated as an inferior strategy than a comparison of diagonals,
or of confirming versus disconfirming instances: ( (A+D) versus
(B+C)). In reality, in situations in which the marginal
frequencies are unequal, a comparison of conditional
probabilities provides a more accurate judgment than a
comparison of confirming and disconfirming cases. For example,
assume that the likelihood of recovering when given medication
A is equal to the likelihood of recovering when given
medication B, but medication A is prescribed twice as often
as medication B, so that the marginal frequencies are unequal.
In this case, a comparison of conditional probabilities will
yield a correlation of zero, accurately indicating the lack
of relationship between the type of medication taken and
14
recovery. On the other hand, a comparison of confining and
disconfirming cases will suggest that the two medications are
not equally related to recovery, as the unequal number of
instances of medication A and medication B will be taken into
consideration.
Green et al. found that subjects who showed a high level
of thought in the causal task (transitional formal thought)
advanced to a higher level of thought (fully formal) with the
noncausal task. On the other hand, subjects who showed a
lower level of thought (concrete operations)
,
regressed in the
noncausal task. Green et al. concluded that judgments of
noncausal relations require a higher level of thought than
judgments of causal relations. This is consistent with
Einhorn and Hogarth's prediction that judgments of noncausal
relations encourage the use of more of the available
information. According to Green et al., this can result in
either an increase or a decrease in an individual's
performance, depending on the sophistication of their
reasoning
.
Most studies in the covariation literature base their
conclusions solely on subjects' final judgments of the
strength of relation between the variables. This is usually
a number on a scale from 0 to 100, or -100 to +100 if negative
correlations are included. In order to develop a process
model of how judgments of covariation are made, an
understanding is needed of the effects of task demands on
15
subjects' actual judgment-making strategies, rather than only
on their final judgments, a design developed by Shaklee and
Tucker (1980) and Shaklee and Hall (1983), the "rule
diagnostic approach," differentiates between four possible
data combining strategies. Each of the strategies represents
a different combination of the four cells of the contingency
table. The following four judgment rules were included in
their work:
1. Cell A information only.
2. Cell A versus Cell C.
(Shaklee el al refer to this strategy as A versus B, but in
a traditional contingency table it would be labeled A versusC . )
3. Comparison of the sum of the diagonals, or delta d
( (A+D) versus (B+C))
4. Comparison of the conditional probabilities, or delta p.
( (A/A+B) versus (C/C+D)
)
The cell A strategy is considered the simplest, and the
least adequate, because it ignores three out the four types
of information. The comparison of the conditional
probabilities is considered the most sophisticated because it
includes all four types of instances and combines them in such
a way as to be sensitive to marginal frequencies. In the
Shaklee et al. studies, the problems are structured so that
the cell A problems can be solved correctly by all four
strategies, A versus C problems by strategies 2, 3, and 4,
sum of diagonals problems by strategies 3 and 4, and
conditional probability problems by strategy 4 alone.
16
The Shaklee et al. task required subjects to view a set
of observations which described each of two events. For
example, a plant was pictured as healthy or sick, as a
function of amount of water, large or small. After receiving
24 observations, subjects made a judgment about the relation
between the two events on a three point scale. The three
points represented a negative correlation between the events,
a correlation of zero, or a positive correlation. Each
subject was then classified as using one of the four
strategies depending on the number of problems they judged
correctly.
This design was successful in detecting systematic
differences in subjects' strategies. For example, Shaklee
and Tucker (1980) found that while 17% of high school students
used the cell A strategy, the simplest of the four, only 1%
of the college students did so. Furthermore, in one study,
Shaklee and Hall found that only 14 of 80 subjects failed to
match any of the four judgment patterns they included, and
subjects appeared to be fairly consistent in their use of a
particular strategy.
Clearly the four judgment rules which were included are
but a subset of all of the possible strategies that subjects
could be using. Although the use of each of the four
strategies provides a unique pattern of results, alternate
strategies could also account for the same pattern of results.
In particular, a comparison of cell A and cell B would have
17
produced judgments which were indistinguishable from the A
versus C strategy, and in some of their experiments, the
results would have been indistinguishable from the sum of the
diagonals strategy and the comparison of conditional
probabilities as well.
If Einhorn and Hogarth's (1986) distinction between
analyses of causality based on sufficiency and necessity is
valid, it would be particularly beneficial to construct
problems to distinguish between the cell A versus B and the
cell A versus C strategies. The use of the cell A versus B
strategy represents viewing causality in terms of sufficiency
whereas the use of the cell A versus C strategy represents
viewing causality in terms of necessity.
In summary, most of the previous work has ignored the
distinction between causal and noncausal relations. The work
which has focused on this question has relied solely on
subjects' self-reports. The present research was designed to
examine the effects of the causal nature of the variables and
of the instructions on subjects' process for making a judgment
of covariation.
\
CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT
The primary manipulation in the present study involved
a comparison of subjects' strategies in a noncausal and in
several causal conditions, in each causal condition, subjects
were presented with information about variables with a one-
way relation. They were read a cover story about patients who
either took or did not take a medication, who subsequently
recovered either slowly or quickly from a disease. in the
noncausal condition, subjects were given information about a
two-way relation. They heard a cover story about patients who
had or did not have a particular physical symptom and their
speed of their recovery from a disease.
The second manipulation involved a test of Einhorn and
Hogarth's (198 6) hypothesis about forward biasing and backward
biasing questions. Three different questions were used in
conjunction with the causal variables: The first of these was
an unbiased question. The second question focused on how the
event, taking or not taking the medication, influenced the
speed of recovery from the disease. The third question was
biasing in the backward direction and focused on how the speed
of recovery was influenced by taking or not taking the
medication.
In sum, there were four between-subject conditions: The
first group of subjects received the noncausal cover story
18
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and the unbiased question. The second, third, and fourth
groups of subjects received the causal cover story. The
second group of subjects were asked the forward biasing
question, the third group of subjects were asked the backward
biasing question, and the fourth group of subjects were asked
the nonbiasing question.
Design
In the following study, there were several modifications
of the rule diagnostic approach used by Shaklee et al. (1980,
1983). Problems were included to distinguish between the
(A-B) and the (A-C) strategy, although no problems were
included to identify the cell A strategy because such a low
percentage of college age subjects have been shown to use this
strategy (Shaklee & Tucker, 1980). In addition, problems with
negative correlations were not used, as it has been
demonstrated that people have particular difficulty
understanding the concept of negative correlations and in
making accurate judgments. (Malmi, 1986; Seggie, 1975; Jurd,
1975)
Delta p and phi were included as two normative measures
of strength of relation. Delta p, the difference between the
two row or column conditional probabilities, is considered to
be the appropriate statistical measure for judgments of
strength of relation between two binary variables when there
is a one-way, or causal relationship. For this study, delta
20
p represents the difference between the row probabilities:
delta pp . For these particular problems, delta p does not
differ much for the columns and rows. Phi, the correlation
coefficient, is included as well as it is generally considered
to be the normative measure when there is a two-way, or
noncausal relationship between row and column variables
(Allan, 1980)
.
As in the rule diagnostic approach, problems were
structured so that the different strategies produced
distinctly different patterns of results. Whereas subjects
in the Shaklee et al. studies made categorical judgments on
a three-point scale, in this study subjects made judgments of
strength of relation on a 100 point scale.
Subjects were given six problems, each with 24
observations. The objective strengths of relation, as
measured by delta p r , ranged from .56 to -.2. 1 Table 2
presents the 2X2 contingency tables for each of the six
problems. For both the causal and the noncausal cover
stories, the column variable (B) was rate of recovery. The
two levels of this variable were recovering quickly and
recovering slowly. For the causal cover story, the two levels
of the row variable (A) were taking a medication and not
1 As discussed, the decision was made not to include problems
with negative correlations. The intended value of delta p r and phi
for problem 6 was zero, but in designing the stimuli, the value was
unintentionally set to -.2.
21
taking a medication. In the cover story for the noncausal
group, the two levels of the row variable were having a
symptom and not having a symptom.
The problems were structured to differentiate between
(A-B)
,
(A-C)
,
and the three strategies which make use of all
four cells of the contingency table. The problems were not
designed to distinguish between the sum of the diagonals
strategy (delta d)
,
delta p r , and phi. These three strategies
involve attention to all four cells of the table and represent
a high level of sophistication of reasoning. in order to
differentiate between them, a substantial increase in the
number of problems would be required.
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients
for the normative judgments based on each of the five
strategies. Other than delta d, delta p r , and phi, which are
highly correlated, the correlations of the other strategies
are all negative and close to zero.
The six problems were presented in one of two orders.
The observations within each problem were randomly ordered.
Each problem was presented in one of two orders, the second
of which was the reverse of the first.
Subjects
Eighty-eight University of Massachusetts students
participated for course credit or for five dollars. The data
from five subjects were dropped because their responses
22
included a judgment of zero for four or more of the six
problems. Subjects were run in groups of five or fewer; some
subjects were run individually. Groups of subjects were
randomly assigned to instructional groups, with the
restriction that there be an equal number of subjects in each
instructional group, and in each of the four orderings within
an instructional group. An experimental session lasted
approximately 25 minutes.
Procedure
Each subject was read the causal or the noncausal cover
story as well as the general instructions. They were told to
write down their judgment of strength of relation, a number
from zero to 100, at the end of each of the six problems.
Subjects were given the opportunity to ask questions about
their task before beginning.
The 24 observations for each problem were played on a
portable cassette recorder. At the end of each problem, the
tape recorder was turned off and the question subjects were
to respond to was repeated. When everybody had written down
their answer, the next problem was started.
Materials
Causal task.
The causal cover story was introduced as follows:
"A new strain of the flu has just been identified. Not much
23
is known about it yet, but some people who come down with it
recover in about 24 hours while others take much longer.
As little is yet known about the virus, different doctors
are prescribing different medications to their patients. A
group of medical researchers is now attempting to determine
if there is a relationship between the type of medication a
patient takes and the rate at which they recover.
You will be asked to make judgments about six different
medications. For each medication you will listen to a series
of statements. Each statement will provide information about
one patient. You will be told if they took that type of
medication or did not take that type of medication, and if
they recovered slowly or quickly."
This cover story was then followed by one of three
questions
:
1. ) The non biasing question: "You will be asked to judge
how strongly the medication and the recovery rate are
related."
2. ) The forward inference question: "You will be asked to
judge the degree of influence that the medication has on the
rate of recovery."
3. ) The backward inference question: "You will be asked to
judge the degree to which the rate of recovery is influenced
by the medication."
Subjects were then read the following instructions
regarding the judgment scale:
"Your judgment will range from 0-100. A judgment of 0
means that there is no relationship between the type of
medication a person takes and their rate of recovery while a
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judgment of 100 means that there is a perfect relationshi
between the type of medication a person takes and their rate
of recovery."
Subjects then listened to 24 observations for each of the
six medications:
rtll,erea
n^^ : P6rS°n tOC* thS and
ntl\Lt^™U™;.::°ne PerS°n t0°k the -^cation and did
Cell C information: "One person did not take the medciationand recovered quickly." ^lauon
Ce
i
1
^,
D
^
inffrination: "0ne Person did not take the medicationand did not recover quickly."
Noncausal task.
The noncausal cover story was introduced as follows:
"A new strain of the flu has just been identified. Not much
is known about it yet, but some people who come down with it
recover in about 24 hours while others take much longer.
Different people with this virus have different symptoms,
including coughing, sore throat, fever, headache, congestion,
and stomach pains. A group of medical researchers is now
attempting to determine if there is a relationship between the
symptom that the patients have and the rate at which they
recover.
You will be asked to make judgments about six different
symptoms. For each judgment, you will listen to a series of
statements. Each statement will provide information about
one patient. You will be told if they have that symptom or
do not have that symptom, and if they recovered slowly or
quickly, you will be asked to judge how strongly the sympto^
and the recovery rate are related.
Your judgment will range from 0 .100 . A judgment Qf „
means that there is no relationship between the type of
symptom a person has and their rate of recovery, while a
judgment of loo means that there is a perfect relationship
between the type of symptom a person has and their rate of
recovery.
"
Subjects then listened to 24 observations for each of the
six symptoms:
Sickly
1
»
f0rmati0n: "°ne perSon had the symptom and recovered
Cell B information: "One person had the symptom and did not
recover quickly."
Cell C information: "One person did not have the symptom and
recovered quickly."
Cell D information: "One person did not take have the symptom
and did not recover quickly."
Results
Table 4 presents a summary of subjects' judgments of the
strength of the relation between the row and column variables
for each of the six problems. The first four columns of Table
4 contain the average judgments for each of the four
instructional groups. The fifth column contains the overall
average judgment for each problem, and the sixth and seventh
columns contain the objective measures, delta p r and phi
respectively, of the strength of the relation in each of the
six problems.
As can be seen in Table 4, there was a considerable
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amount of variability in subnets' ratings, with standard
deviations ranging from about 18 to 34. This seems to be
comparable to the variability reported in other studies (e.g.
Arkes & Harkness, 1983; Wright fi Murphy, 1984), although in
much of the literature there is no report of variability, so
the comparison is limited. Despite this variability, on the
average, subjects were sensitive to the variations across
problems. Overall, mean ratings varied from 37.84 for problem
two, in which delta p r = phi = 0, to 61.83 for problem six,
in which delta p r = .56 and phi = .49. In an analysis of
variance on subjects' judgments, with instructional group,
order of problems, and sequence of trials within a problem as
the between-subjects variables, there was a highly significant
effect of problems, F(5,335) = 11.02, p < .001.
With the exception of problem six, the rank order of
subjects' judgments followed that of the rank order of
delta p r and phi. If problem six is not included (a
discussion of problem six is to follow) , the Pearson
correlation coefficient for the mean subject ratings for
problems one through five, with the normative responses
according to delta p r and phi, were r = .991 and r = .993
respectively.
Although problem six had a lower delta p r and phi than
problem 5, the average judgment in problem six was larger than
the average judgment in problem five. Delta p r and phi for
problem six were -.2 and the average judgment was 47.72, while
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delta p r and phi for problem five were zero and the average
judgment was 37.84. These ratings differed significantly from
each other: F(l,67) = 11.36, p = .001. Problem six had a
higher rating than problem five in all four instructional
groups as well as in the overall mean.
One explanation for this reversal was that when the
materials were prepared, delta p r and phi for problem 6 were
set to -.2 instead of zero, as was intended. This may have
created some confusion for the subjects since they were
instructed to express their judgments for each problem as a
number between zero and 100. If subjects were aware that the
direction of the correlation was negative, they may have been
confused as to how to translate their judgment into a positive
rating. Not only did the judgment scale include only positive
numbers, but, as was mentioned, it has been demonstrated that
people have particular difficulty understanding the concept
of negative correlations and in making accurate judgments
(Jurd, 1975; Malmi, 1986; Seggie, 1975).
Another possibility is that subjects were aware that the
absolute relation between the variables was greater than zero.
They may have then based their judgment on the magnitude of
this relation and not the direction. This would explain why
the mean judgment for problem six was higher than for problem
five. in fact, if delta p r and phi for problem
six had
actually been +.2 instead of -.2, the
correlation of
subjects' ratings for all six of the problems and delta p r
or
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Phi, would have been r = .987 and r =
.992, respectively.
Alternatively, it is possible that subjects were unaware
of the negative correlation, and the reversal for problems
five and six was based on the representation of the 24
observations in each of the problems. Although problems five
and six did not differ greatly in delta p r and phi, the
distribution of frequencies across the four cells of the
contingency table was very different for the two problems.
In problem five there were an equal number of occurrences in
each of the four cells of the contingency table. Of the 24
patients, 12 were given the medication or had the symptom, and
12 patients recovered quickly. This is probably the most
intuitive way of representing a correlation of zero. In
problem six on the other hand, 17 out of the 24 patients were
given the medication or had the symptom, and 16 out of the 24
patients recovered quickly.
Looking at the strategies which are included in Table 2,
for problem five the judgments are the same regardless of
which of the strategies is used. In problem six the situation
is very different. Unless subjects used the information from
all four cells of the contingency table and combined this
information in a way which took the unequal marginal
frequencies into account, their judgments would have been
considerably larger than zero, and considerably larger than
their judgment in problem five.
Looking at the average judgments separately for each of
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the four instructional groups (see Table 4), one finds a
somewhat different pattern than for the average over groups,
in the ANOVA of subjects' ratings there was not a significant
main effect of instructional group, although there was a
significant interaction of problems and instructional group,
F(15, 335) = 2.112, p = .009. This interaction reflects a
different pattern of judgments over problems, depending on the
set of instructions and the cover story that subjects
received. Also significant in this ANOVA were two
uninterpretable third order interactions: Problems x
Instructional group X Order, F(15, 335) = 1.940, p = .019, and
Problems X Order X Sequence, F(5, 335) = 3.70, p = .003.
One way of attempting to understand the interaction
between problems and instructional group is by examining
subjects' ratings in terms of the five strategies that have
been discussed. Subjects' strategy use was analyzed in two
ways: The judgments of each subject were correlated with the
judgments predicted by each of the five strategies. In the
first analysis an attempt was made to classify each subject
according to one strategy. In the second analysis, an average
correlation across subjects was determined for each strategy.
A somewhat arbitrary rule was used in order to decide
which strategy each subject was using. Table 5 lists the
classifications when subjects were classified as using a
strategy if the correlation of their responses and the
responses according to that strategy was r > .3. Strategies
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delta d, delta p r and phi are not evaluated separately because
they are so highly correlated with each other. with r = .3
as the cut-off, the number of subjects using each strategy is
about the same for the three causal groups. On the other
hand, the subjects in the noncausal group were less likely to
be classified as using any of the strategies. In each of the
four instructional groups, causal as well as noncausal, more
subjects were classified as using one of the strategies which
involves the use of all four cells of the contingency table
than either the (A - B) or the (A - C) strategy.
When the cut-off is set higher, at r =
.6, the pattern
changes. Table 6 presents this classification. By raising
the criterion, the number of subjects in the noncausal group
who cannot be classified as using any of the strategies is
now about the same as that of the causal forward and the
causal unbiased group. In this analysis, the subjects in the
causal backward group show a different pattern of strategy use
than subjects in the other three groups. Consistent with the
data in Table 5, subjects were classified as using delta d,
delta p r , or phi more often than either (A - B) or (A - C)
.
Although there is a simplicity in interpreting the data
when subjects are classified categorically, this type of
analysis does involve an arbitrarily chosen categorization
rule. And as has been demonstrated, the choice of where to
place this cut-off can strongly affect the final
interpretation. Unfortunately, with this set of data, this
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analysis does not allow for any conclusive theoretical claims
about the effects of the causal nature of the variables on
subjects' strategies for making judgments of strength of
relation.
In the second analysis, the correlations of each
subject's judgments and the responses predicted by each of
the five strategies were averaged across subjects. Table 7
presents a summary of the average Pearson correlation
coefficients. m the first four columns the average
correlations are presented separately for each of the four
instructional groups. m the fifth column the overall
averages are presented for each problem.
As can be seen by looking at the fifth column of the
table, there is no evidence that subjects are using either
the (A - B) or the (A - C) strategy. Both of these
correlations are very close to zero: for (A - B)
, r = .068,
and for (A - C)
,
r = -.009. The correlations with delta d,
delta p r and phi are much higher, again suggesting that
subjects may be using all of the information provided, or in
the least, they are not systematically dismissing information.
In an ANOVA on these data, there was a main effect of
strategies, F(4, 268) = 7.357, p < .001. The data set
included the same between-subject variables as in the original
ANOVA: instructional group, the order of the problems, and the
sequence of trials within each problem, but the within-
subjects variable was now strategy instead of problem. In
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this analysis, the dependent variable was the correlation
coefficient for subjects- judgments and strategies, instead
of the actual judgments on the problems.
This main effect of strategies suggests that classifying
subjects' ratings into strategies may provide a useful
framework for attempting to understand subjects' behavior, and
for examining the nature of the interaction between subjects'
responses and instructional group.
Looking at the first four columns of Table 7, the
correlations are somewhat different for each of the four
instructional groups than for the overall average. As was
found in Table 5, subjects in the noncausal group appear less
likely to have used any of the strategies. Looking at the
column averages in Table 7, the average correlation for the
noncausal group is r = .051, which is lower than any of the
causal groups.
This difference in the average correlation for each
instructional group is reflected in a marginally significant
between-subjects main effect of instructional group:
F(3, 67) = 2.72, p = .051. The within-subjects interaction
of instructional group and strategies was not significant,
p = .201. It therefore remains unclear how the causal nature
of the variables influenced subjects' strategy use.
Although the interaction between instructional group and
strategies is not significant, there is a trend which is worth
noting. With the exception of the causal backward group and
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the (A
- B) strategy, none of the groups show any evidence of
using the (A - B) or the (A - C) strategy. But the groups
behave somewhat differently from each other with regard to the
strategies delta d, delta p r , and phi. Although these
correlations are quite low in the noncausal group, they are
somewhat higher for the three causal groups. This trend does
not support the prediction (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Green et
al. # 1979; Seggie et al., 1975) that subjects use more of the
information when they are making judgments about variables
which are not causally related.
In order to assess the magnitude of the influence that
problem six had on the results, additional analyses were
performed on problems one through five only. In an ANOVA on
the judgments, the pattern of results did not differ from
the ANOVA which included all six problems. There was a
significant main effect of problems as well as a significant
interaction between problems and instructional group. In an
ANOVA on the correlations of subjects' responses and the
judgments predicted by the five strategies, there was also no
change in the pattern of results when problem six was
excluded. There was a significant main effect of strategies
and a significant between-subjects effect of instructional
group. But, as in the original ANOVA, the interaction between
strategies and instructional group was not significant.
In sum, in the ANOVA of the judgments on the six
problems, as well as on problems one through five only, there
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was a significant effect of problems, suggesting that subjects
were sensitive to the variations across problems. There was
also a significant interaction between problems and
instructional groups. While this suggests that subjects were
influenced by the set of instructions and the cover story that
they received, further analyses did not provide much insight
into the nature of this interaction. m the analysis of
subjects' use of the strategies, there was not a significant
interaction between strategies and instructional group. Due
to the variability within each subject's responses as well as
between subjects, it was difficult to assign subjects to
strategies and to identify differences between instructional
groups. There was somewhat of a trend for judgments in the
noncausal group to correlate less strongly with any of the
five strategies than the judgments in the causal groups.
There was also a trend across all four instructional groups
for subjects to use one of the strategies which involved all
four cells of the contingency table rather than the (A - B)
or the (A - C) strategy.
CHAPTER 3
DISCUSSION
The motivation for this study was to determine if
subjects' strategies for making judgments of strength of
relation are different for variables which are causally and
noncausally related. Previous research has suggested that
when subjects are presented with variables which are causally
related they tend to ignore information from some of the cells
of the contingency table, while subjects making the same
judgment of strength of relation with variables that are not
causally related use more of the available information.
Furthermore, research in other areas of psychology, as well
as fields outside of psychology, have provided empirical and
theoretical evidence that suggest that causality is a
psychologically real construct. The purpose of this study,
therefore, was to investigate the possibility that subjects
differ in their process for making a judgment of strength of
relation when the variables are causally and noncausally
related.
Unfortunately, based on the data and the analyses
presented, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions.
Although there was a significant interaction between problems
and instructional group, in subsequent analyses no clear
pattern of results emerged to explain this interaction. Most
notably, in examining subjects' use of the strategies there
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was no clear pattern of strategy use within any one
instructional group nor were there clear differences between
instructional groups. Several of the trends which did emerge
were not consistent across the different analyses.
One interesting finding was that the majority of subjects
seemed to have used information from all four cells of the
contingency table. As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, more
subjects were classified as using delta d, delta ppl and phi
than either (A - B) or (A - C) . As well, as can be seen in
Table 7, the average correlations are highest for these three
strategies which involve all four cells of the table. In
light of the debate over people's competence for making
judgments of covariation, these data suggest that people do
not systematically dismiss entire sources of information when
making a judgment. These data also do not support the claim
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Green et al., 1979; Seggie et al.,
1975) that subjects use less of the available information when
the variables are causally related. Looking at Table 7, the
trend is actually in the opposite direction; the correlations
with delta d, delta p r , and phi are higher in the causal
groups than in the noncausal group.
Some of the difficulties in drawing conclusions about
these data are due to methodological problems which are
specific to this study, while others are due to problems which
are common to much of the covariation literature. One of the
factors which makes it difficult to determine which, if any,
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of the strategies subjects were using is the variability in
subjects' responses. One of the reasons for this variability
may have been the small number of trials in each problem, m
the probability learning literature, subjects were faced with
the simpler task of predicting which of two events was going
to occur based on one or more probabilistic cues. Studies
used up to 500 trials and judgments did not reach an asymptote
for at least 50 trials (Castellan, 1977). If it is assumed
that subjects start with a base judgment, for example of 0 or
50, and then increment or decrement this initial judgment
after every new observation, after only 24 observations their
judgments should still have been fluctuating significantly.
If this is the case, the final judgment may have been strongly
influenced by irrelevant dimensions, such as the order of the
trials
.
In addition, with only six problems per experimental
session, subjects may not have settled into any one strategy
until several problems into the experiment. When the average
correlations between subjects' judgments and the normative
responses according to the strategies were subjected to an
ANOVA, the pattern of results was somewhat different when all
six problems were included than when only the 4th, 5th, and
6th problems were analyzed. In the full ANOVA there was a
main effect of instructional group: F(3,67) = 2.72, p =.051.
When only the final three problems were included, this effect
disappeared, (p = .695) This suggests that the pattern of
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responses across problems may have not have been consistent.
With a greater number of problems, subjects' behavior may have
been more stable.
Another source of variability may have been the oral
presentation of the information. This is in contrast with most
of the other studies of covariation in which the information
is presented visually, m this study, the subjects' task was
fairly passive and involved little more than sitting and
listening to the same four sentences over and over. After
completing the experiment, several subjects reported that they
had had a difficult time maintaining their attention
throughout the experiment.
Beyond these specific criticisms of the task, there are
limitations in using the framework of strategies as the basis
for investigating the process of making a covariation
judgment. One problem with this approach is that it is
difficult to determine empirically which strategies subjects
are using. Any attempt to develop a set of problems for which
the use of the different strategies will produce a pattern of
responses which are distinct from each other places heavy
constraints on the problems. In this study, it was not
possible to develop problems with very high objective
correlations which produced different predictions for each of
the strategies. And many other problems acted much like
problem 5, in which all five strategies generated the same
judgment
.
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Another difficulty arises in classifying subjects'
responses into strategies, as was discussed in the previous
section. Crocker (1981) discusses the difficulties of
analyzing judgment data and suggests that this is one of the
serious methodological problems in the field of covariation.
Although there are several methods of interpreting judgment
data, each of them has its limitations.
One method that is commonly used (e.g. Allan & Jenkins,
1980, 1983), is to correlate subjects' judgments with the
normative responses according to each of the strategies. This
allows for some speculation as to the extent that subjects are
using the information in the four cells of the 2 X 2 table and
how they are combining this information, particularly if the
results are clear cut and the correlations are very high or
very low. But since the correlation coefficient is sensitive
to such aspects of the data as the spread of the scores, the
interpretation is often not clear. For example, if subjects
were actually using one of the strategies but were only using
a limited range of the 100 point scale, their responses might
not correlate very highly with that strategy.
Another difficulty arises if these correlations are then
averaged across subjects for each of the strategies, as was
done in Table 7. If it is assumed that subjects are using
only one of the strategies, then the correlation of their
responses with the strategies they are not using is at best
difficult to interpret, and at worst, meaningless. If, for
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example, a subject is not using the (A - B) strategy, it is
not necessarily meaningful to draw any theoretical conclusions
based on the size of the correlation of their judgments with
the normative responses according to the (A
-B) strategy. The
interpretation of a negative correlation between a subject's
judgment and the normative responses of one of the strategies
is particularly unclear.
It may therefore be more enlightening to disregard the
correlations of subjects' responses with all but the one
strategy that they are using, or that strategy with which
their judgments correlate most highly. This involves
classifying subjects categorically as using one (or none) of
the strategies, as was done in Tables 5 and 6. Although this
analysis is somewhat simpler to interpret it involves using
a somewhat arbitrary categorization rule. Table 5 presents
classifications of subjects based on the rule that the
correlation of their responses and the judgments predicted by
that strategy was .3 or greater; with this rule subjects in
the noncausal group were less likely to use any of the a
priori specified strategies than subjects in the three causal
groups. On the other hand, it could reasonably be argued that
a correlation of .3 is too low of a cut-off and that a .3
correlation between subjects 1 judgment data and the responses
predicted by one of the strategies does not necessarily mean
that the subjects were actually using that strategy. When the
cut-off was set higher, at r > .6 (see Table 6), very
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different theoretical conclusions could have been drawn from
these data.
In addition to deciding on the appropriate statistical
analysis, there are a number of difficult design choices to
be made. The most obvious example of this involves the choice
of the subset of strategies to include. in making this
decision, not only does one have to consider all of the
theoretically driven combinations of cells (A vs. B, A vs. C
etc.)
,
but also the many ways the same cells can be combined.
For example, in including a strategy that reflects Einhorn and
Hogarth's hypothesis that subjects making a forward causal
inference will focus on cells A and B, it is not clear if the
strategy should be (A - B) or (A/ (A + B) ) .
Clearly it is not possible to develop a set of problems
which makes it possible to distinguish between all of the
possible strategies. Since subjects can only be said to be
using one of the strategies which was included in the study,
the design of the study puts serious constraints on the
theoretical conclusions which can be drawn.
Another limitation of using strategies as a framework
for covariation research is the assumption that subjects use
the information from each of the cells of the 2X2 table in
an all or none fashion. A more plausible assumption is that
subjects differentially weight the four kinds of information.
For example, in Einhorn and Hogarth's forward causal
inference, even if subjects do concentrate on cells A and B,
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it is unlikely that they completely ignore the information
from cells C and D. A more plausible strategy than either
(A + B) or (A/A + B) might be something like:
(A/ (A + B) ) - k (C/ (C + D) ) , where 0 < k < l.
Up to this point, the discussion of the limitations
involved in using the concept of strategies as a way of
characterizing subjects' behavior has included concrete design
problems: Because most subjects' responses do not correlate
perfectly, or even strongly, with one strategy it is not clear
how to best analyze the data and characterize any individual
subject's process. Equally unclear is which strategies should
be included. Both of those difficulties point to the fact
that strategies are normative models rather than process
models. Even if the methodological problems could be
addressed, all of the plausible strategies specified, a set
of problems developed to distinguish between them, and each
subject classified definitively as using one and only one
strategy, the result would be a description of performance
rather than a process model. It would still not be clear as
to how subjects had formed their judgments or how changing
various parameters would affect this process.
As discussed earlier, Crocker (1981) breaks down the
process of making a covariation judgment into six separate
subcomponents: (1) deciding what data are relevant, (2)
sampling cases, (3) classifying instances, (4) recalling the
evidence and estimating the frequencies of confirming and
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disconfirming cases, (5) integrating the evidence, and (6)
using the covariation estimate. Even if subjects had been
successfully classified as using one particular strategy,
little could be said about their process in each of these
stages. if, for example, there had been clear evidence to
support Einhorn and Hogarth's position, and subjects in the
forward causal inference group had tended to generate
judgments that correlated highly with the (A - B) strategy,
there would be several very different possible explanations
for this effect. Utilizing Crocker's stages, this result can
be explained in terms of one of several of the stages.
It could be claimed that the causal nature of the
variables affects stage 2, sampling cases. When the variables
are causally related, subjects may find the information from
cells A and B more relevant than the information from cells
C and D and therefore be more likely to encode this
information. Another equally plausible interpretation would
be that this effect was due to differences in stage 4,
recalling the evidence and estimating the frequencies of
confirming and disconfirming cases. While subjects were
initially collecting the information, they may not have been
biased in their memory for the four types of instances, but
at the point in the task when a judgment was required, they
may have had better recall for the information in Cells A and
B. A third possible explanation for this effect involves
stage 5, integrating the evidence. Subjects could have
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accurately sampled cases, accurately recalled and classified
this information, but their decision rules could have given
greater weight to cells A and B than to cells c or D.
in most of the covariation literature, inferential leaps
are made in an attempt to explain how a variety of parameters
have affected subjects- process of making a judgment. Most
studies only examine subjects' final judgments. However, the
question of the influence of a parameter such as the causal
nature of the variables on the process of making a judgment
is actually several distinct questions. For example, assuming
that Crocker's stages are valid, the causal nature of the
relationship between variables may have a very different
effect on the stage of classifying instances than it does on
integrating evidence.
Although no one experiment can provide information about
each of the stages involved in making a judgment of
covariation, a more systematic exploration, or a bottom-up
approach, would allow more concrete conclusions and less of
a need to draw largely speculative inferences from the data.
There has not been sufficient work which directly tests
subjects' behavior with the simpler stages of the process.
In attempting to answer the question about the effects of the
causal nature of the variables, what is needed is a thorough
investigation of its effects on each stage of the process.
For example, in studying the effects of this parameter on the
stage of the process when subjects sample instances, subjects
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could be asked only to estimate the frequencies of the four
types of instances rather than to make a judgment of strength
of relation. The effects of a variety of parameters could
then be studied in relation to this stage of the process: the
number of observations, the order of the trials, the wording
of the question, and so on. With this type of understanding
of each stage of the process, a model could then be developed
which could begin to successfully predict subjects' responses
under a number of conditions, and adequately explain what
subjects were doing at each of the stages.
Although the top-down approach which has primarily been
used in the field has been valuable in identifying the
parameters of interest and generating relevant questions, a
more systematic exploration of the process is needed before
these questions can be satisfactorily answered.
APPENDIX
TABLES
TABLE 1
The standard lay out of a contingencytable for two binary variables.
OUTCOME
present absent
POTENTIAL
CAUSE
present A B
absent C D
TABLE 2
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nn^2?enC? tables for the six Problems, and
2a™oi
V?hWent: f°r SaCh Pr°blem ' biseS oneacn of the five strategies.
Pr°blem A^B A^C Delta d Delta p r Phi
T~.
Bl B2
A1 5 1 4 0 12 .56
.49
A2 5 13
2 .
Bl B2
Al 3 2 1 -1 12 .39 .35
A2 4 15
3 .
Bl B2
Al 9 8
A2
.24 .22
4.
Bl B2
Al 8 2 6 -1 2 .16 .17
A2 9 5
5.
Bl B2
Al 6 6
A2 6 6
6.
Bl B2
Al 11 6 5 5 0 -.2 -.21
A2 6 1
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TABLE 3
Matrix of Pearson Correlation Coefficients forjudgments predicted by each strategy (See TaM.
Strategy
strategy h-B a^C~ Delta d Delta p r PhT~
A-B 1. 000
A-C
-0.078 1.000
Delta d -0.129
-0.372 1.000
Delta p r -0.127 -0.382 0.908 1.000
Phi
-0.126
-0.403 0.885 0.997 1.000
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TABLE 4
Mean ratings on the six problems', and delta pr and
Instructional Group
Problem NolT= Causal Causal Causal Mean
causal Forward Backward Unbiased
1 52.
t O "7
27
Jo)
65.
( 28 .
19
32
)
73.
(21.
55
01)
57.
(25.
10
07)
61.
(26.
83
49)
2 63 .
(29.
32
14)
50.
(29 .
62
60)
43 .
(34.
60
01)
51.
(28.
70
08)
52.
(30.
55
56)
3 50.
(24.
09
44)
51.
(25.
29
60)
43.
(23 .
50
29)
48.
(20.
68
61)
48.
(23.
68
64)
4 45.
(28.
86
14)
48.
(28.
62
50)
53.
(23 .
60
41)
36.
(22.
60
31)
46.
(26.
19
09)
5 45.
(23 .
27
64)
43 .
(21.
14
01)
29.
(18.
20
17)
32 .
(22.
75
65)
37.
(22 .
84
20)
6 50.
(25.
05
17)
52.
(22.
57
96)
51.
(25.
00
27)
36.
(22 .
80
34)
47.
(24.
72
36)
Mean 51. 15 51. 91 49. 10 43. 94 49. 14
Delta Phi
63
39
24
16
-.21
.19
49
35
.22
. 17
-.20
. 17
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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TABLE 5
Number of subjects using each strategy when cut-off for classification is placed at r = 3
Instructional
Group
(A-B)
Strategy
(A-C) Delta d
Delta p r
Phi
None
Noncausal 10
Causal
Forward
Causal
Backward
9
11
Causal
Unbiased
13
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TABLE 6
off?or°Mr
b
^
CtS
.Vsin? each strategy when cut-ff f r classification is placed at r = .6
Instructional
Group
Noncausal
(A-B)
Strategy
(A-C) Delta d
Delta p
Phi
None
11
Causal
Forward 12
Causal
Backward
10
Causal
Unbiased 11
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TABLE 7
=nK"HLfe^_
corremi°n coefficients of
igies
suh^Pfc rr \Uiieifltl
nve
B
strat^^entS responses for
Instructional groups
Strategy Non Causal Causal Causal Mean -Causal Forward Backward Unbiased all subject!
(A" B)
-- 090 '091 .344
-.057
.068
(A-C)
-.008
.012
-.036
-.006
-.009
Delta d .159 .201 .295 .411 .263
Delta p r .099 .197 .303 .403 .246
phi .093 .188 .290 .390 .236
Mean .051 .138 .239 .228 .161
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